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BOOK REVIEW
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Richard J. Ansson, Jr.*
American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of
Justice. By David E. Wilkins. University of Texas Press. 1998. Pp. 403.
L Introduction
In 1823, the Supreme Court addressed its first federal Indian question in
Johnson v. McIntosh,' and since McIntosh, the Court has decided numerous
federal Indian questions. Indeed, in the past thirty years, the Supreme Court
on average has addressed five federal Indian cases each term.2 Overall, in the
175 years since McIntosh, the Supreme Court's holdings in federal Indian
cases have ranged from favorable to devastating, and throughout this period,
scholars have sought to coherently analyze many of these conflicting
decisions.
David Wilkins, in his book American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S.
Supreme Court, is the latest scholar who has attempted to analyze the
perplexing field of federal Indian law. Wilkins employs critical legal and
historical analysis in evaluating fifteen of the Supreme Court's federal Indian
decisions? In so doing, Wilkins claims that such analysis "should go far
toward explaining why and how the Court arrived at these important Indian
law decisions" and should lead to a discussion addressing the "larger issue of
why the core democratic concepts of fairness, justice, and consent of the
governed have not yet been fully realized for tribal nations and their citizens
despite clearly pronounced treaty rights, federal policies of Indian self-
determination and tribal self-governance, positive judicial precedents, and a
triple citizenship" (p. 5).
Unfortunately, by analyzing only fifteen cases - many of which are not
very well known4 - through the lenses of critical legal analysis, the author
fails to adequately discern the issues he has sought to highlight. The author's
*Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. L.L.M.,
1998, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. J.D., 1997, University of Oklahoma
Law Center, B.A., 1994, University of Oklahoma.
1. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE L w 123-32
(1987).
3. See infra note 6.
4. See infra note 7.
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analysis is misguided for two reasons. First, the author fails to demonstrate
that his theory holds true in favorable as well as unfavorable Indian law
decisions.' Second, the author fails to examine in any great length the
historical context in which the cases were penned. This article, after
evaluating Wilkins' analysis, proposes that Indian law decisions should be
examined in light of the historical and political context in which they arose.
Part II details Wilkins' misguided critical legal and historic analysis of the
fifteen Supreme Court decisions. Part III denotes Wilkins' missteps by
exploring the Supreme Court's treatment of federalism and Indian law. Part
IV concludes by stressing that federal Indian opinions decided by the Supreme
Court should be examined and evaluated in light of the historical and political
context in which they arose.
II. Wilkins, Critical Legal Analysis, and the Supreme Court
A. Legal Consciousness and Critical Legal Analysis
Wilkins first outlines several broad areas of legal consciousness that the
Supreme Court has employed when deciding federal Indian questions. First,
in Wilkins' opinion, the Supreme Court has analyzed federal Indian questions
in light of constitutional or treaty considerations (pp. 10-11). The author states
with :regard to this premise that:
The basic assumption of this legal consciousness is that
constitutional or treaty considerations (i.e., ratified treaties or
agreements) are the only relevant instruments for the adjudication
of a legal dispute between tribes and the federal/ state
governments. This consciousness is evident in Supreme Court
opinions dealing with tribal sovereignty Which generally
acknowledge the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations and their
pre- and extraconstitutional aboriginal rights of self-government.
(p. 10).
Second, in Wilkins' opinion, the Supreme Court has analyzed federal Indian
questions in light of the United States' duty to "civilize" American Indians
(pp. 11-14). According to Wilkins, the Supreme Court has sanctioned
paternalistic federal policies and, by so doing, has elevated the law to become
an "effective instrument for civilizing indigenous peoples who are considered
culturally inferior" (p. 11). Wilkins states that this consciousness is evident
when the Supreme Court sanctioned Congress' assimilationist policies at the
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century (pp.
13-14).




Finally, Wilkins asserts that in deciding federal Indian questions the
Supreme Court has used the law to further the development of the United
States as a nation-state (pp. 14-16). In Wilkins' estimation, the Court has
exercised its use of this consciousness in two ways. First, the author asserts
that the Supreme Court affirmed assimilationist policies that aided merging
"politically subordinate cultural group[s] into the politically dominant cultural
group" (pp. 14-15). Second, Wilkins advocates that the Supreme Court used
the law to aid in the establishment of federalism (pp. 15-16).
In Wilkins' opinion, the Supreme Court's use of these three aforementioned
legal consciousnesses have allowed the Court to mask its decisions (p. 10).
Wilkins argues that if one removes the mask one will find that the Supreme
Court's real legal consciousness has stressed the "tribes' allegedly inferior
cultural, political, technological, social, and spiritual status in relation to the
prevailing lifestyle of Euro-America" (p. 10). Wilkins, therefore, hopes that
by identifying and unmasking the previous judicial consciousness he can
"establish a sense of the moral basis of the law [which is] the critical element
that has seemingly been abandoned in American jurisprudence but is still
recognized by tribal nations in their understanding of treaties and federal
statutes" (p. 16).
B. Critical Legal Analysis and Selectively Chosen Supreme Court Decisions
Wilkins selectively applies his analysis to fifteen federal Indian law
cases' - some of which are relatively obscure7 and only one of which is
6. In chapter 2, Wilkins discusses Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), and The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616 (1871). These cases discuss wide-ranging issues such as aboriginal land title, the
political status of tribes, and treaty abrogation (p. 17).
In chapter 3, Wilkins analyzes United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). These cases
document Congress' plenary power over Indian tribes. (p. 17).
In chapter 4, Wilkins reviews United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), Northwestern Bands
of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945), and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 273 (1955). These cases discuss aboriginal land holdings - Tee-Hit-Ton - and
Indian allotments - Nice. (p. 17).
In chapter 5, Wilkins scrutinizes Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
and United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). These two cases involved two
different issues. Sioux Nation involved a question of land title and treaty rights whereas Oliphant
involved a question of a tribe's power of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (p. 17).
Finally, in chapter 6, Wilkins details Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988), Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), and County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251 (1992). These three cases each involve restriction of a tribal member's freedom of
religion, either constitutionally or statutorily (p. 17).
7. This comment is directed at Wilkins' use of United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567
(1846), The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871), Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S.
504 (1896), United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians
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favorable to Indian rights! After discussing the facts and holdings of each
case, Wilkins attempts to prove that the Supreme Court used different legal
theories as masks in an overall effort to deprive individual Indians and Indian
tribes of justice.
For instance, Wilkins claims that the Supreme Court masked its injustices
in Johnson v. McIntosh,9 United States v. Rogers," United States v.
Kagarna," and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States" when it employed the
doctrines of discovery and conquest to deny individual Indians and Indian
tribes of the justice they so deserved (p. 299). Additionally, Wilkins notes that
in other cases such as Rogers, Kagama, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,3 and United
States v. Sioux Nation,4 the Supreme Court relied on the plenary power
doctrine to deny Indians and Indian tribes justice (p. 299). In all, Wilkins
denotes an additional seven doctrines that the Supreme Court has employed
to deny Indians justice.15
Wilkins also notes that although the Supreme Court, over the years, has
served "predominantly as a legitimator of congressional and executive
actions," the Court has employed certain legal concepts that have gone beyond
justifying congressional action (p. 302)." In some cases, the author argues
that the Supreme Court has relied on an implied congressional intent to deny
Indians and tribes justice (p. 302). At other times, Wilkins maintains that the
Court has contrived "a scenario in which it pits one law or treaty provision
against another and then 'chooses' the one most likely to effect whatever
political ends it is striving to accomplish" (pp. 302-03). 7
v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
8. Wilkins asserts that United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), is
"the one case among my selections that has been interpreted as a 'victory' for the tribal party by
some commentators." (p. 17).
9. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
10. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
11. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
12. 348 U.S. 273 (1955).
13. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
14. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
15. Wilkins also notes that the Supreme Court employed the political question doctrine in
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
616 (1871), and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); the doctrine of geographic
incorporation in Rogers, Kagama, Cherokee Tobacco, and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978); the guardian-wardship doctrine in Kagama, Lone Wolf, Oliphant, and
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); the doctrine of good faith in Lone Wolf and United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); the doctrine of affirmative delegation in
Oliphant and Nice; the doctrine of implicit divestiture in Oliphant; and the incidental effects
doctrine in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (p. 299).
16. To support this proposition, Wilkins cites to Kagama, Lone Wolf, Nice, Lyng, and
Northwiestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).




C. Wilkins & Critical Legal Analysis
Wilkins states that by employing critical legal analysis he "intended to
demythologize 'the law,' as expressed through the language of fifteen Supreme
Court opinions that have affected Indian law" (pp. 2-3)." However, instead
of demythologizing the law, Wilkins' critical legal analysis actually
mythologizes it. Indeed, by asserting that the Supreme Court employed unique
legal principles to Indians and Indian tribes solely to mask the injustices its
holdings were perpetuating (pp. 298-303), Wilkins creates a myth by
overstating his critique of legal doctrine."
Critical legal analysis is famous for seeking "to convince a reader that a
supposedly objective legal rule really contains imbedded subjective value
choices and that even though the rule appears neutral, it falls more heavily
upon society's disempowered."' However, Wilkins' analysis seemingly goes
further than just trying to convince the reader that an apparently neutral rule
falls more heavily upon society's disempowered. Instead, Wilkins tries to
convince the reader that the Supreme Court's pattern of masking injustices in
legal doctrines has been routinely orchestrated (pp. 298-303)2 - so much
so that one can link all of these injustices together to "demythologize the law"
(pp. 2-3).
Many academicians find fault with critical legal studies analysis because
they view critical legal studies analysis as an overstated critique of legal
doctrimne. Indeed, Wilkins' analysis is overstated in numerous ways, and one
of the more obvious is his failure to discuss his critique of the law within a
historical context. Wilkins acknowledges from the outset that he intends to
demythologize the law "by focusing upon the broad institutional, societal, and,
most important, historical effects of the Court's very political activities" (pp.
2-3). However, Wilkins' analysis does not explore the historical and political
underpinnings of the Court's decisions. Ironically, Wilkins himself stated that
Cherokee Tobacco (treaty provision v. law), and [Ward v.] Race Horse [163 U.S. 504 (1896)]
(treaty provision v. statute)." (p. 303).
18. Critical legal studies scholars have argued that the current legal system excludes outsiders
by undue mystification of the law. BAILEY KuKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPLE, FOUNDATIONS Of
THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 175 (1994). Other criticisms
of the current legal system that have been advanced by critical legal studies scholars include
"indeterminacy of legal doctrine; ... ; doctrine and procedure structured to obscure the political
aspects of law; protection of the interests of the dominant under the guise of neutrality." l
19. See infra note 22 and accompanying text for more on overstating legal doctrine and the
critical legal studies movement.
20. KUKLIN & STEMPLE, supra note 18, at 175. Critical legal studies analysis is also known
"for exploring in detail purported contradictions that result from widely accepted but overstated
concepts, such as the objective/subjective dichotomy, the separation of individual and community,
the public/private distinction, the false choice between order and anarchy, and other dualities."
Id.
21. See supra Part I1.B.
22. KUKLIN & STEMPLE, supra note 18, at 175.
No. 2] 469
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"it is impossible to understand how the coordinate branches of government
arrive at policy decisions regarding the constitutional and treaty rights of
American Indian tribes, and individuals constituting these tribes, without total
immersion in a historic context" (p. ). Unfortunately, Wilkins does not
heed his own advice, and his analysis proceeds to explore the historical
context only if it tends to prove his analysis.
11I. Federal Indian Law, Federalism, and the Supreme Court
Wilkins asserts that federalism has been one of the legal masks that the
Supreme Court has employed to deny Indians and Indian tribes justice (pp. 8-
17). Wilins explains that federalism was used as a mask in the following
ways:
The mask worn by the federalizing agents viewed the United
States as the core unit such that nonfederal entities must either be
absorbed or vanquished. The masks applied by the Court to the
tribes divided them according to degree of "savagery," . . . into
the assimilable and unassimilable, tribal nations that were deemed
capable of being Americanized (from a Euro-American
perspective) and joining the United States as separate, though
integrated, political entities versus those mostly western tribes that
were caricatured as "wild" and "uncivilized." In masking the legal
process, Law was clearly an agent of national unity. During the
late 1800s and well into the twentieth century, the Court rendered
a number of decisions indicating a clear intent to dilute the
extraconstitutional status of tribes by unilaterally declaring them
"wards" of the government and disavowing their separate,
independent status. The assertion of congressional power over
tribal lands, resources, and rights is evidence of this nationalizing
effort. (p. 16).
Wilkins' critique, however, seems to be overstated and misguided in many
respects - a truism associated with critical legal analysis.' According to
Wilkins' account, the Supreme Court used federalism in the late 1800s and
early 1900s to justify the congressional policy of assimilation because the
Court wanted to deny Indians and Indian tribes justice. Unfortunately, by
falling to discuss the concept of federalism outside the aforementioned period,
Wilkins does not address whether the Court has used the doctrine of
23. Wilkins is absolutely correct in emphasizing the value of examining the historic relations
between the tribes and the federal government. Indeed, Nathan R. Margold, a former solicitor of
the Interior Department, stated that "[f]ederal Indian law is a subject that cannot be understood
if the historical dimension of existing law is ignored." FLx S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW xvii (Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942).




federalism on an evenhanded basis. This inquiry is an important one because
if the Court has used the doctrine of federalism on an evenhanded basis, then
the Court may have afforded justice to Indians and Indian tribes under the
doctrine of federalism. Therefore, the Court would not necessarily have been
using federalism as a mask for justice during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
A. Federalism & The Early Supreme Court
By the time Chief Justice John Marshall had the opportunity to wrestle
with the question of Indian affairs and its relationship with principles of
federalism, he had already established himself as a devote federalist and
nationalist.' Appointed by federalist-minded President John Adams, Chief
Justice Marshall quickly established himself as the protector of federal
principles, and, as such, Marshall penned his opinions to advance the
federalist cause.' Indeed, by the time Chief Justice Marshall was presented
with a case concerning federal-state-Indian relations, he had already written
numerous decisions establishing federal supremacy over the states."7
During the United States' early years, states tried to exert their powers over
a number of different matters - many of which they knew they had
voluntarily ceded to the federal government in the United States
Constitution.' In the realm of Indian affairs, the states had given the federal
government control over managing Indian relations. Nevertheless, some
states tried to exert and retain control over Indian affairs?3
The desire of certain states to retain control over Indian affairs rested in
the fact that the states' colonial predecessors had almost dominated control
over Indian affairs.' During this period, the crown set the general policies,
but the management of Indian policies generally was left to the separate
colonies 2 As early as 1754, Benjamin Franklin had suggested that the
colonies should form a union of colonies and centralize control over Indian
affairs.3 The very next year the British Crown also sought to centralize
25. See, e.g., ROBERT G. McCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 35-52 (2d ed.
1994); SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ESSAYS 22-25, 60-68, 320-25
(2d ed. 1991).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress'
powers were to be broadly construed and that the states were not to burden, retard, or impede the
exercise of such powers).
28. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 320-25.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause).
30. See, e.g., SHARON O'BREN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 55-61 (1989);
see also Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of
Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
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Indian affairs through the appointment of Indian agents directly responsible
to London.'
In 1781, the nation approved the Articles of Confederation in which article
IX vested the Continental Congress with power to regulate trade and manage
affairs with Indians, not members of any states?5 States had residual
authority over Indian affairs within their own states.' After the Revolution,
the federal government tried to regulate Indian affairs; however, it
encountered resistance from certain states - New York, North Carolina, and
Georgia - when it sought to establish boundary lines with various tribes."
In 1789, the United States Constitution was adopted, and in the
Constitution, the states delegated the power to regulate "Commerce... with
the Indian tribes" to Congress." In 1790, Congress asserted its power when
it enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 which forbade the sale of
land by any Indians within the United States to any person or state, unless
done in a public treaty under U.S. authority. 9 After 1790, Congress
continued to enact legislation designed to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes."'
The Supreme Court first addressed an Indian question in 1823 in Johnson
v. McIntosh.4' In McIntosh, the Supreme Court did not recognize a private
purcha.e of land between a non-Indian and an Indian tribe.42 In so doing, the
Court gave federal sanction to the doctrine of discovery which declared that
Indians held only a possessory use interest in the land and that the United
States held legal title.43 Though McIntosh primarily addressed the question
of aboriginal land title, the decision, in terms of federalism, recognized the
United States' right, not Indian tribes or states, to the land. Without this
decision, the new federal government's power would have been severely
limited because it would have encountered a legal quagmire in deciding the
legitimacy of land titles in United States territory.
The Supreme Court next addressed an Indian question in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia. In Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees brought suit in an effort to
prevent Georgia from imposing its state laws within Cherokee Territory."
Although Chief Justice Marshall refused to accept the case because he had
34. .5ee id.
35. See ROBERT N. CULNTON ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 141 (3d ed. 1991).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause).
39. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 329, 329-32.
40. See O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 51-52.
41. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
42. See id at 573-74.
43. See id.
44. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
45. See id at 20.
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determined that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state which could sue
Georgia in the United States courts, he held that the Cherokee Nation was a
domestic dependent nation because it was a distinct political society capable
of managing its own affairs and governing itself. In so doing, Chief Justice
Marshall rejected the argument of state-rights Justices Baldwin and Johnson
who sought to allow the state to impose laws over the Cherokee Nation.
The very next year Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v. Georgia,' used
principles of federalism to protect the Cherokees from Georgia's attempt to
impose its laws on the Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, a non-Indian was
arrested for living within Cherokee Territory without permission from state
authorities and was convicted for violating a Georgia law that required such
permission.s The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and declared the
statute unconstitutional. 49 In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon the
constitutional doctrine that regulation of Indian affairs was granted to the
federal government and not to the states."
B. The Supreme Court and the Post-Civil War Years
In 1883, in Ex parte Crow Dog,' Crow Dog killed another Indian.
Federal authorities subsequently tried Crow Dog for murder.' Crow Dog
argued that the federal government could not try him because the federal
courts had no jurisdiction over Indian activities on the Lakota Reservation.
The Supreme Court affirmed this argument because Congress had not enacted
legislation giving it criminal jurisdiction over the tribes.' Congress reacted
to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act of 1885 which gave federal
courts jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill,
arson, burglary, and larceny!'
The very next year, in United States v. Kagama,' the Supreme Court
looked at Congress' claim to criminal jurisdiction in Indian affairs" In
Kagama, two Indians killed another Indian on the Hoopa Valley Indian
Reservation in California." The Supreme Court .held that the government
could enact such legislation, not under the Indian Commerce Clause, but by
46. See iU.
47. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
48. See id. at 559-61.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
52. See id. at 557.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 572.
55. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 19-20 (3d ed. 1998).
56. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
57. See id. at 375-76.
58. See id.
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virtue of its authority as guardian of the tribes."9 Since Kagama, numerous
decisions have allowed Congress to broadly regulate Indian affairs."
However, where Congress has not acted, the Supreme Court has upheld a
tribe's sovereign rights. For example, in 1896 in Talton v. Mayes,"' the
Supreme Court, during the height of the assimilation era, held that Indian
tribes could use grand juries whose number of members did not meet the
requirements of the United States Constitution. This was because tribes were
exercising their own independent sovereignty which did not arise from the
federal government.'
C. The Supreme Court and the Modem Era
During the modem era, states have sought to exercise power over tribes.
However, the Supreme Court has by and large struck down state efforts to
infringe upon tribal sovereignty.' 3 For example, in McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Commission," the Supreme Court held that Arizona lacked jurisdiction
to impose its state income tax on an Indian resident of the Navajo reservation
who derived her income from reservation sources.' The McClanahan Court
further noted that the state has no power over any matters where the subject
matter is Indian and within the Indian reservation.
D. Federalism & The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has applied principles of federalism in a fairly
evenhanded manner to federal Indian cases. Under principles of federalism,
the Supreme Court has denied the right of states to regulate Indian tribes
unless Congress has authorized the states to regulate tribes.' Additionally,
the Supreme Court has given Congress much latitude in regulating Indian
59. See id at 384-85.
60. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that Congress' power
over tribes was absolute, and therefore, Congress had the right to pass a law that violated a
treaty); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (applying Congress' liquor prohibition to
Pueblos even though United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), had held that Pueblos had an
advanced culture).
61. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
62. See id at 385.
63. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) (holding
that "[w]hen on reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally
inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest"); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,388
(1976) (holding that even under Public Law 280, states lacked power to tax property held by
tribal members).
64. 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
65. See id. at 173.
66. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v.




tribes.67 Although decisions made under this doctrine have not always been
favorable to Indians or Indian tribes, the Supreme Court has applied the
principles of federalism in a relatively consistent manner, and, as a result, one
can reasonably conclude that the Supreme Court has not used the doctrine
solely to mask injustice.'
IV. Conclusion
Wilkins' discussion of the Supreme Court's federal Indian holdings, though
interesting and intriguing, is misguided. Wilkins' failure stems from his
inability to "demythologize the law" in his evaluation of fifteen Supreme
Court opinions - many of which were not well known and all of which, save
one, were unfavorable rulings. Instead, of "demythologizing the law," Wilkins
analysis actually mythologizes the law because he overstates his critique of
legal doctrine and because he fails to discuss his critique within a historical
and political context. Consequently, future analysis evaluating federal Indian
opinions decided by the Supreme Court should be examined in light of the
historical and political context in which they arose.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Kagarna, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
68. Unfavorable decisions include: United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United
States v. Kagana, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
Favorable decisions include: McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commi'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Talton
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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